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 Chapter 8 
 The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: 
From Biological Foundations of Agency 
to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity 
 Mog  Stapleton and  Tom  Froese 
8.1  Introduction 
 Following on from the  philosophy of  embodiment by Merleau- Ponty ,  Jonas and 
others,  enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be 
brought into a fruitful dialogue about the  nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we 
present the enactive conception of  agency , which, in  contrast to current mainstream 
theories of  agency , is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this  thinking we 
argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically 
embodied (even if distributed) agent, and that this  embodiment must be affectively 
lived. However, we also consider that such an affective agent is not necessarily also 
an agent imbued with an explicit  sense of subjectivity. To support this contention we 
outline the interoceptive foundation of basic  agency and argue that there is a qualita-
tive difference in the phenomenology of  agency when it is instantiated in organisms 
which, due to their  complexity and size, require a nervous system to underpin their 
physiological and sensorimotor processes. We argue that this interoceptively 
grounded  agency not only entails  affectivity but also forms the necessary basis for 
subjectivity. 
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 To begin with, we introduce an emerging movement in  cognitive science and 
related fi elds, known as  enactivism . The enactive approach to  cognitive science 
brings together several fi elds of study into one coherent research program of life, 
mind and sociality (Thompson  2007 ; Di  Paolo and Thompson  2014 ). It thereby 
inherits the interdisciplinary perspective that is characteristic of the cognitive sci-
ences, but puts special emphasis on a number of additional fi elds that have been 
neglected by the mainstream. In particular, the enactive approach stands out by 
bringing together two venerable traditions of continental philosophy, Husserlian 
phenomenology and the philosophy of the organism, with cutting edge research in 
the sciences of  complexity , as formalized by  dynamical systems theory (Weber and 
 Varela  2002 ). Perhaps surprisingly, the insights gained by phenomenology lend 
themselves to being described as  structure s in a temporal fl ow using  dynamical 
systems theory (Varela  1999 ), and  Husserl ’s method of using imaginative variation 
to reveal a phenomena’s essential characteristics is not far removed from computer- 
aided systems modeling of minimal cognition ( Froese and Gallagher  2010 ). 
Similarly, key philosophical claims about the self-organizing and self-producing 
 nature of organisms, going back at least to  Kant , are starting to fi nd expression in 
the fi elds of AI, systems  biology and artifi cial life modeling ( Froese and Ziemke 
 2009 ; Di  Paolo  2010 ). 
 This confl uence of approaches puts  enactivism in a privileged position to inves-
tigate the relationship between biological  embodiment and phenomenological sub-
jectivity (e.g. Desmidt et al.  2014 ). It does so by conceptualizing the objectively 
living  bod y ( Körper ) and the subjectively  lived body ( Leib ), following  Husserl ’s 
([1952]  1989 ) 1 terminology, as two sides of the same coin. The traditional mind- 
 body problem is therefore converted into the more tractable “mind- body - body prob-
lem” (Hanna and Thompson  2003 ). And we are given an additional mediating 
concept that has been almost completely neglected in analytical philosophy of mind, 
but which has taken center stage in  enactive theory , namely life itself:
 The Mind-Body-Body  Problem […] is how to understand the relation between (i) one’s 
subjective  consciousness , (ii) one’s living and lived  body ( Leib ), that is, one’s animate  body 
with its “inner life” and “point of view;” and (iii) one’s  body ( Körper ) considered as an 
objective thing of nature, something investigated from the theoretical and experimental 
perspective of natural science (physics, chemistry, and  biology ). (Hanna and Thompson 
 2003 ) 
 This constellation of phenomena has long fascinated the phenomenological tradi-
tion of philosophy. For example, Scheler ([1928]  2008 ),  Plessner ([1928]  1975 ), 
Merleau- Ponty ([1942]  1983 ), Sartre ([1960]  2004 ) and  Jonas ([1966]  2001 ) were 
all in their own ways interested in grounding the origins of human subjectivity in the 
most basic principles of organic being and behavior. To be sure, accepting that the 
human condition is partially constituted by forms of organic and animal life does 
not entail that these forms explain all there is to being human. For example, 
 Heidegger ([1929]  1995 ) was inspired by the biologist von Uexküll ( 1909 , [1934] 
1  Stylistic note: we cite the most recent English edition of our sources whenever this is possible for 
ease of reference. However, in order to avoid giving a false impression of the original date of 
publication, we also always provide the year of publication of the fi rst edition in square brackets. 
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 1957 ), who argued for the existence of an organism’s own point of view (i.e. its 
 Umwelt ), to  contrast the restricted point of view of the animal from the conceptual 
world of the human. Nevertheless,  Heidegger recognized that our being-in-the- 
world ( Dasein ) depends both on  Dasein ’s understanding of being as well as on 
 Dasein ’s living  embodiment (Kessel  2011 ). 
 This tradition of relating subjectivity with biological  embodiment is not a mere 
historical relic; it is continued by modern phenomenological philosophers such as 
Barbaras ( 2005 ), Gallagher ( 2005 ) and Zahavi ( 1999 ), who also engage with the 
ongoing development of  enactive theory (e.g., Barbaras  2002 ,  2010 ; Zahavi  2011 ; 
Gallagher  2012 ). In the following we complement these efforts by sketching an 
enactive approach to the question of how a physical living  bod y ( Körper ) can be an 
affectively  lived body ( Leib ) and also a refl ectively lived  consciousness . Specifi cally, 
fi rst we will describe what kind of  embodiment is an essential prerequisite for affec-
tive  agency and then we will consider some additional biological  constraints that are 
imposed by phenomenological subjectivity. Here we are not concerned with giving 
the biological or the phenomenological domain metaphysical priority but, following 
 Varela ’s ( 1996 ) working hypothesis of neurophenomenology, with putting insights 
from both domains into a relationship of mutual  constraints to further our under-
standing of the phenomenon of life as a whole. 
8.2  Biological Foundations of  Agency 
 What is it about biological cognitive systems that makes us want to talk in terms of 
them being agents? It cannot merely be that they move around in and make changes 
to the  environment – after all a robotic vacuum cleaner achieves this very effec-
tively. If we admit such a reactive robot into the class of agents, then we have to 
include the humble thermostat as well, and the concept of  agency eventually  ends 
up being so inclusive so as to be theoretically useless ( Froese  2014 ). Nor can it be 
that a system must have a thematised  feeling of  agency , explicitly experiencing 
themselves as the author of their actions to the point of refl ective  self-awareness . 
Such a strong stipulation would plausibly rule out most non-human animals and 
quite possibly even infants: biological systems which – even though they may not 
be aware of it – intuitively instantiate some sort of basic  subjecthood beyond its 
mere attribution by others. 2 There is something deep in the notion of  agency , such 
that we know that merely attributing  agency to a system, from our perspective as 
 external observers, is not suffi cient for it to genuinely be an agent (Rohde and 
Stewart  2008 ). Agency is intrinsic to the system itself, but in virtue of what? 
 The most obvious feature of systems which one might consider as uncontrover-
sially agentive is that they have wants and needs. The kinds of robots which are 
2  The attribution of  subjecthood by others may in fact be an essential element in infants’ develop-
ment of an explicit awareness of their own subjectivity (Reddy  2003 ), but on the view we are 
promoting here they were already agents on their own terms even before they were born. This is 
what allows much of the  body schema to develop  in utero rather than post-partum (Lymer  2011 ). 
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commonly termed ‘agents’ in informatics seem – at least on the surface – to have 
these, typically because they have been programmed, designed or evolved so as to 
move as if they are satisfying needs (e.g. Parisi  2004 ). Biological systems, of course, 
do not need to act  as if they have them. As Weber and  Varela ( 2002 ), following  Jonas 
([1966]  2001 ), argue, their needs are fundamental to their continued existence: a 
living  system that no longer has any needs to satisfy is in fact no longer a living 
system. As an aside, we note that the phenomenon of an agent’s wants is a bit more 
diffi cult to address, because fulfi lling a desire goes beyond the mere satisfaction of 
an existing, well-defi ned lack to an open-ended quest for something that is not yet 
present (Barbaras  2002 ,  2010 ). As such, desires are probably dependent on a more 
explicit awareness of one’s own subjectivity. 
 The  enactive theory of  agency has its roots in these biological foundations of 
cognitive systems. A precursor to its theoretical framework started taking shape in 
the cybernetics movement ( Froese  2010 ), for example in attempts to explain organ-
isms’ purposeful behavior in terms of feedback  dynamics . Another important mile-
stone was Maturana and Varela’s ( 1987 ) work on the self-organising and 
self-producing properties of minimal living systems such as the  cell . They argued 
that the  cell is the minimal living system because it forms itself as an identity – that 
is to say it forms itself as a system distinct from its  environment . Its particular  orga-
nization allows it to be self-producing – the processes that go on inside the  cell 
produce the boundary of the  cell which distinguishes it as an identity, and this 
boundary allows these processes within the  cell to keep going and producing it – a 
circularly causal process (Varela et al.  1974 ; Varela  1979 ). This form of organiza-
tion of the living system was termed  autopoiesis , a concept that is closely related to 
a number of other technical concepts. 
 While autopoietic  systems are material systems, what is key to the formation of 
their own systemic identity is the specifi c organizational  nature of the metabolic 
processes rather than the particular material processes with which that organization 
is realized (for an introductory overview, see Di  Paolo and Thompson  2014 ). The 
autopoietic organization is defi ned as autonomous because it has the property of 
operational closure, which means that the organization subserves a dynamic process 
of self-generation under far-from-equilibrium conditions. In other words, an auton-
omous system is organized as a network of processes that mutually depend on each 
other, and on the organization of the whole network, for their continued existence. 
Although there are similarities between these ideas and the cybernetics of feedback 
systems, the crucial difference is that  autonomy ensures that the system is genuinely 
self-determining from the bottom up and not just self-maintaining a set of externally 
defi ned conditions ( Froese and Stewart  2010 ). 
 These requirements are not trivial, but nevertheless an autopoietic  system could 
spontaneously emerge and continue to exist and self-generate without having to be 
a sensorimotor system – providing that it exists in optimal conditions that provide 
everything it needs for its continued self-production. In addition, there are some 
interesting examples of self-organizing material systems that may or may not be 
autopoietic  systems , such as a tornado or dust devil. Here we need to be careful to 
distinguish  self-maintenance from self-production.  Autopoiesis refers to a network 
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of processes of  production of new components, whereas a tornado and a dust devil 
presumably are only  rearranging pre-existing components. Things are not quite as 
simple as this (see, e.g., the critical discussion by McGregor and Virgo  2011 ), but 
the difference between synthesis of new components compared to mere re- 
organization of existing components provides a useful heuristic. 
 Nevertheless, a spontaneously emerging autopoietic  system – even if it were 
autonomous, would not be  agentive – its movements and indeed entire existence are 
at the mercy of  external factors and its survival as a system is just a matter of luck 
that the right conditions for its continued existence happen to occur. In actual fact, 
even the simplest autopoietic  systems , such as reaction-diffusion systems, are not 
 entirely passive; they are capable of  self-movement and a limited range of  interac-
tion s with their  environment ( Froese et al.  2014 ). But the important point here is that 
these basic autopoietic  systems are not capable of actively regulating their behavior 
in relation to their needs. Although in the early formulations of the enactive approach 
an equivalence between autopoietic, living, and cognitive systems was assumed 
(e.g., Stewart  1992 ), this has started to be questioned. Some enactivists currently 
argue that  autopoiesis is necessary but not suffi cient for life and life necessary but 
not suffi cient for cognition ( Froese and Di  Paolo  2011 ) while others argue that it is 
 autonomy rather than  autopoiesis that is necessary for cognition (Thompson  2007 ; 
Thompson and Stapleton  2009 ). The precise relation between  autopoiesis ,  auton-
omy , and life remains an open question for future research (see in particular the 
discussions in Thompson  2011 ; Wheeler  2011 ). 
 Di  Paolo ( 2005 ) enhanced the concept of  autopoiesis with that of  adaptivity in 
order to yield an organizational  structure which subserves the kind of systems that 
we consider to be agents. An autopoietic  system , however it is instantiated, is going 
to have limits to what kind of changes can happen in the  environment and within its 
own systems that still allow the system to continue. At some point, however robust 
the system is, if the changes from the  organization are too great it is not going to be 
able to self-produce and self-maintain. The set of changes that can happen within 
these limits are its viability set. According to Di  Paolo ( 2005 ), in order for an auto-
poietic  system to be able to continue its existence under changes in the  environment , 
rather than just cease to exist as a system, it needs to “(i) be capable of determining 
how the ongoing structural changes are shaping its trajectory within the viability 
set, and (ii) have the capacity to regulate the conditions of this trajectory appropri-
ately” ( Froese and Di  Paolo  2011 , p. 8). This is the property of  adaptivity (Di  Paolo 
 2005 ; see also Barandiaran and Moreno  2008 ). There is a  growing consensus in 
 enactivism that  autopoiesis and  adaptivity are necessary and suffi cient for life, and 
that therefore living is sense-making because the underlying  adaptive processes are 
normative (Thompson  2011 ). 
 The processes necessary for  adaptivity can occur within the system, i.e. by means 
of modifi cation of the internal milieu, but only to a certain extent. In order to be 
more  adaptive , a system must be able to adjust its relationship with its  environment , 
such as by moving its position to a more favorable location, in order to change the 
effect this  environment has on its viability. And because these changes in its  envi-
ronment caused by its moving are related to what the system needs in order to 
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 continue its existence, this movement is not a mere passive motion but is realized 
according to some goal or norm (survival), and is thus defi ned as an action. This 
gives the system intrinsic  agency . 
 Developing this idea, Barandiaran et al. ( 2009 ) propose an operational defi nition 
of  agency . After critically reviewing existing defi nitions of  agency , they argue that 
“we can generalize that  agency involves, at least,  a system doing something by itself 
according to certain goals or norms within a specifi c  environment ” (p. 369), and 
fl esh this out with the necessary and suffi cient conditions/aspects of  agency , namely 
 individualit y,  interaction al  asymmetry , and  normativit y. More specifi cally,
 (i) there is a system as a  distinguishable entity that is different from its  environment , (ii) this 
system is  doing something by itself in that  environment and (iii) it does so according to a 
certain goal or  norm . (Barandiaran et al.  2009 , p. 369). 
 Let us consider these three requirements of  agency in more detail.
 (1)  Individuality: Individuality needs to arise from the  structure of the system 
itself rather than be attributed from an outside observer. Thus an artifi cial sys-
tem could conform to this requirement, but only if the processes which consti-
tute it as a system bind it together in a coherent way and by doing so distinguish 
it from the  environment with which it interacts ( Froese and Ziemke  2009 ). It 
does not suffi ce to just distinguish a part of the world and view it as a system for 
our explanatory purposes. It may be useful to think of some non-self- individuated 
parts of the world as active systems, but to do so is to think of them from  our 
perspective and not as a result of any particular  dynamics of the system in ques-
tion  as an individual . To think in this way therefore does not imply that such 
systems have an identity of their own ( Froese  2014 ). A mobile robotic ‘agent’ 
of the kind standardly found in robotics labs therefore does not fulfi ll this crite-
rion – it is we who demarcate the mechanisms of the robot as the relevant sys-
tem for our explanatory project. We could just as well demarcate the level of its 
 interaction s with other robots as the level of the system – as we do in swarm 
robotics. Or even ‘agent +  environment ’ as the system (Beer  2000 ). It all comes 
down to what our explanatory project is. There does not seem to be a basis for 
a more or less ‘correct’ attribution of the system’s boundaries. Compare this to 
a living  cell . In the case of the  cell the tight interactions between its components 
feed back to each other and enable each other to exist and to continue as such, 
i.e. the system consists of a network of operationally closed processes. It is – 
ontologically – an individual because when we, in our role as  external observ-
ers, distinguish it as a system appropriately, then the system will reveal itself to 
us as actually autonomously distinguishing  itself , that is, as existing indepen-
dently of our epistemological  choices and distinctions. 
 (2)  Interactional  asymmetry : for  agency it is not suffi cient for an individual sys-
tem to just be a moving system, nor to merely be in  interaction with the  environ-
ment or other systems. Nor is it suffi cient for it to rely on a subsystem (which is 
not relevantly interconnected with the rest of the system) that drives its move-
ment (e.g., the idea of metabolism-independent chemotaxis, see Egbert et al. 
 2012 ). The movement must arise at the agent level as a whole so that the agent 
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uses the movement to modulate its coupling with the  environment . The key 
point here is that  agency requires that the  adaptive regulation of agent- 
 environment interaction is realized by the agent rather than resulting only from 
contributions of the  environment . This distinction is important because some 
types of behavior can be  adaptive at the level of the population, i.e. they lead to 
enhanced reproductive success, while still remaining reactive at the level of the 
individual, i.e. they are driven mostly by the  environment ( Froese , et al.  2014 ). 
Active regulation of interaction does not need to be happening all of the  time in 
order for us to attribute agenthood but it must be a relevant aspect of the system. 
It is this aspect that underpins the system’s greater adaptability as its regulated 
movement allows it to fi nd an  environment that better suits its viability set. 
 (3)  Normativity: The concept of normativity should not be misunderstood as 
applying only in relation to human cultural conventions that guide action, 
although in that context it certainly fi nds a particularly elaborated expression 
(Torrance and  Froese  2011 ). What is of interest here is something more funda-
mental, namely the biological norms that guide  adaptive behavior. For a move-
ment to be an action of an agent it must be a movement of an individual, have 
 interaction al  asymmetry (arise from the agent modulating its coupling)  and be 
relevant to some goal – a goal which it either achieves or fails to achieve. This 
goal should not be externally given and the system arbitrarily directed toward 
its realization, such as when designing an artifact to behave in certain ways. 
Rather the goal should arise from and be relevant to the system’s self-producing 
and self-maintaining activity. In a manner of speaking the system must aim at a 
goal in order for its movement to be an action, and it must be possible to fail at 
achieving this goal. However, we should beware of letting our manner of speak-
ing mislead us into reifying the basis of this biological normativity into hypo-
thetical entities of some sort, such as explicit representations of goals and 
norms. These are clearly operative in the cultural domain, for example in the 
legal system (Gallagher  2013 ), but they get in the way of operational  explana-
tions aimed at the subpersonal level (Di Paolo et al.  2010 ). Such goals or norms 
emerge within the living  system as a result of the autonomous or  adaptive 
 dynamics (metabolic or otherwise) attempting to keep the system within its 
boundaries of viability (Barandiaran and Egbert  2014 ). 
 An account of  agency that requires  individualit y, interactional  asymmetry , and 
normativity gets us some of the aspects which are key to our intuitive notion of 
 agency , in particular its being the source of action and intrinsic  intentionalit y. While 
these requirements may not be suffi cient for realizing  agency in all its forms, they 
seem to at least be instantiated in systems to which we intuitively do attribute 
 agency . And, of particular import, such an account is operationalisable and thus, 
even though it is grounded in  biology , it is not biologically chauvinist. To say that 
an account of  agency is ‘not biologically chauvinist’ is to say that it does not rule out 
the possibility of a non-biological instantiation of  agency (see also the discussion by 
Thompson  2011 ). The enactive conception of  agency – grounded in the systemic 
principles of  autonomy and  adaptivity – is nevertheless embodied in a non-trivial 
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way, because it is not only that the  body instantiates properties that make it an agen-
tive system but that these functions are by their very nature grounded in  biology : the 
 biology of  value . What this means is that even if it is operationalisable and realiz-
able in an artifi cial system, this artifi cial system will be, in a  sense , an artifi cial 
biological system because the values that arise out of the system and hence its nor-
mativity are grounded in its autonomous (in this case  artifi cial-autopoietic ) self- 
production and  adaptive  self-maintenance , hence it would match our criteria of a 
living  system – even if it is not composed of typical organic material. 
 Agency is one of the ways in which  enactivism is in tension with orthodox (func-
tionalist) philosophy of mind and cognition. If the agential system were a purely 
functionalist system then it ought to be realizable in any kind of different “ hard-
ware ”. Yet if values arise from the self-creation and self-maintenance of a particular 
system, then if you abstract that system from the physical basis that it creates and 
with which it maintains itself, then those values cease to exist for that system (Di 
 Paolo  2009 ). This might seem at odds with the fact that our defi nition of  agency is 
based on organizational criteria and therefore ought to be able to be instantiated in 
a variety of different systems – not only living ones (for a more detailed discussion 
of related concerns, see Wheeler  2011 and Thompson  2011 ). However, while the 
 organization of such an agent is indeed relatively independent with respect to its 
particular physical realization, this does not mean that anything goes, as would be 
the case for functionalism. For example, the essential role of mortality in meaning- 
generation entails that  agency cannot be completely divorced from a precarious 
existence in some material substrate (Di  Paolo  2009 ;  Froese  in preparation ), and 
this necessity of far-from-equilibrium self-production and self-maintenance imposes 
even more specifi c material  constraints . For example, the material of the compo-
nents of the system cannot be inert, but robots are typically built from such material 
( Moreno and Etxeberria  2005 ). And it is the particular material instantiation we 
suggest – what Stapleton ( 2012 ) dubs a system’s “particular  embodiment ” – that 
gives rise to the particular  value s and norms of that system. 
 Advocating that it is a system’s particular  embodiment that matters for  agency , it 
should be noted, is not  in principle at odds with the functionalist approach to 
 embodiment . For example in Clark’s ( 1989 ) work on “microfunctionalism” he 
argues that functionalism need not be identifi ed with formal descriptions pitched at 
a gross level, but that what is essential to functionalism is merely that the “ structure , 
not the stuff, counts” (Clark  1989 , p. 31). In a similar vein Wheeler, drawing on the 
University of Sussex evolutionary  hardware and robotics paradigm of A. Thompson 
(e.g. Thompson  1995 , develops Clark’s ( 1997 ) notion of “continuous reciprocal 
 causation ” arguing that in evolved systems (both biological and artifi cial) the “low- 
level” properties of the  hardware are relevant to  adaptive success (Wheeler  2005 , 
pp. 267–68)). For these reasons at least one of us (Stapleton) is inclined towards 
what she calls a “nanofunctionalist” paradigm (see Stapleton  2012 , Chapter 5 and 
Conclusion). This is the position that the relevant level for understanding cognition 
in natural cognitive systems is very close to (and in some cases entwined with) the 
implementational level. Nevertheless, what is important about this implementation 
is the (nano-)functional role it plays for the system. Such a position however runs 
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the risk of irritating both traditional (functionalist)  embodiment theorists who have 
explicitly rejected radical  embodiment (see for example Clark  1999 ; Wheeler  2010 ) 
for not abstracting from implementation enough, and enactivists who reject the 
functionalist tradition for abstracting from implementation too much. 
 It is however indeed the case for enactivists that what we intuitively consider as 
cognition involves a certain  amount of  autonomy with regard to its bodily basis, for 
example the relative operational  autonomy of the nervous system (Barandiaran and 
Moreno  2006 ). Another  mark of the cognitive may be that it serves to decouple an 
agent from its  environment by mediating its sensorimotor  interaction s (Fuchs  2011 ). 
This decoupling can be achieved in a variety of manners, and  enactivism is currently 
exploring how such  mediation can help to bridge the cognitive gap from basic 
 agency to more full-blown forms of human action (see review by  Froese  2012 ). 
8.3  From Affective  Agency to Subjective Self 
 Given that the enactive conception of  agency already involves an appeal to the nor-
mativity of  adaptive behavior, it also provides a useful foundation for grounding the 
affective dimension of animal existence. Colombetti ( 2010 ), following Weber and 
 Varela ( 2002 ), argues that the processes which subserve the biological (autopoietic) 
 organization of living  system s not only establish a “point of view” and locus of 
 agency but also the enaction of meaning. The idea is that those parts of the world 
that are relevant to the self-production and  self-maintenance of a system have mean-
ing for the system. Here we are not concerned with linguistic semantics. Meaning is 
another aspect of the  value s and norms discussed earlier: all are generated from 
within the system as a result of its relation to those parts of the world it interacts 
with (i.e. its “Umwelt”, according to von Uexküll’s terminology). For something to 
be meaningful to the system is for it to have value for it, and thus for it to have a 
normative character. Colombetti notes that Di  Paolo ’s ( 2005 ) addition of  adaptivity 
to the previously binary (alive or dead) notion of  autopoiesis allows us to account 
for the grades of meaning (or “degrees of value”) offered by a system’s  environ-
ment , and thereby “makes room for a notion of organismic preferences” ( 2010 , 
p. 149). 
 When we understand cognition in these terms, the self-regulatory metabolic 
(homeostatic) functions from which the values and meaning of a particular living 
system emerge are also those that ground emotion for neurobiological theorists such 
as Damasio ( 1999 ,  2010 ) and Panksepp ( 1998 ). Colombetti therefore concludes that 
“[o]n this view of emotion, the account of natural purposes developed by Weber and 
Varela ( 2002 ) and Di  Paolo ( 2005 ) as a theory of bodily sense-making is as much a 
theory of emotion as it is a theory of cognition” ( 2010 , p. 150). In general,  enactiv-
ism provides a fi tting framework for the tight integration of emotion, cognition and 
 perception (e.g. Colombetti  2007 ,  2014 ; Colombetti and Thompson  2008 ; Thompson 
and Stapleton  2009 ; Varela and Depraz  2005 ; Ward and Stapleton  2012 ; Bower and 
Gallagher  2013 ). 
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 This integration of affect and  agency can be seen clearly when we consider how 
value and action are integrated in organismic systems. In a very simple system such 
as a single  cell the internal metabolic  dynamics and those underpinning the  cell ’s 
sensorimotor functions are not segregated very well – although precisely how inde-
pendent they are from each other is debatable (Egbert et al.  2012 ). Nevertheless the 
internal value – from the physiological condition of the  cell – is entwined with the 
action of the  cell to maintain itself within its viability set. So even though it may not 
be a consciously feeling system, it is nevertheless right to think of it as an affective 
system: the world for the  cell is shaped by this affect – it is what imbues the world 
with  value for it, and thus what imbues the  cell with  normativit y. 
 Once the agentive system is constituted by multiple  cells , two issues arise: the 
 complexity of the modulations required, which depend on a larger ensemble of 
physiological states, and the  time it takes for processes in one part of the system to 
affect more distal processes. These increases in internal spatiotemporal distances 
and their bridging in terms of increased bodily sensing and regulation go hand in 
hand with an increase in decoupling from the  environment , or at least an expansion 
of the role of self-mediation in action and feeling. We are therefore approaching the 
transition from mere affective  agency to full-blown subjectivity. In the following we 
consider essential aspects of the internal  organization of this more specifi c form of 
 embodiment in some detail. 
 What is needed for multicellular systems then is some sort of homeostatic mech-
anism, which is both sensitive to the animal’s internal milieu and able to regulate it 
effectively, while at the same time providing the basis for  adaptive  interaction with 
the world. In animals these functions are provided by the nervous system. While 
typically the term ‘ interoception ’ is used to refer to the sensitivity or awareness of 
internal, visceral changes as mediated by the autonomic part of the peripheral ner-
vous system, we suggest that this is a contingent fact based on the predominance of 
research into humans. Interoception as the  sense of the internal  body after all, may 
be mediated through molecular communication networks in, for example, the endo-
crine and immune systems (Cameron  2001 ). That complex multicellular creatures 
like us require a functioning interoceptive nervous system as well does not detract 
from the basic  structure of interoception being essentially a sensitivity to internal 
modulation which is needed in order to effect internal and  external changes for the 
purposes of maintaining or increasing the  adaptivity of the system. While this may 
just be another way of specifying the internal  dynamics of autonomous,  adaptive 
systems, we believe that understanding the mechanisms by which these organisa-
tional criteria are brought about in biological systems will yield an increased under-
standing of the requirements for more complex forms of agentive systems in 
general. 
 Two questions in particular seem to fall out of this. Firstly, how is interoception 
realized in humans and can this specifi c mechanism be operationalized beyond our 
particular  embodiment ? And secondly, how does the instantiation of an interocep-
tive “nervous” system in an agentive system qualitatively alter the system in terms 
of its  agency ? Finding answers to these questions is crucial for developing an enac-
tive approach to  agency that goes beyond an account of organismic  agency in 
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 general, toward an account of animality more specifi cally and, most importantly, of 
human subjectivity. In the following we offer some considerations about how to 
begin answering this open challenge. 
 The term ‘ interoception ’ was introduced by Sherrington in the early twentieth 
century and used by him to distinguish the sense of the visceral  body from the sense 
of limb position ( proprioception ), the senses of touch, pain, and temperature (extero-
ception), sight and hearing (telereception) and taste and smell (chemoreception) 
(Sherrington  1948 , cited in Craig  2002 ). Nowadays vision, hearing, smell and taste, 
like touch, tend to be categorized as exteroceptive, which refers to them being con-
cerned with information  external to the  body . On this kind of distinction, proprio-
ception (and kinesthesia) ought to count as interoceptive, and they are often referred 
to as such. However under the orthodox categorization of the senses it would be 
more correct to think of proprioception and kinesthesia as belonging to the “somatic 
senses” which additionally include pain, temperature, itch and vestibular balance 
(Kandel et al.  2000 ). 
 Interoception is distinct from the other  sense s which take the internal  body as 
their object (proprioception and kinesthesia) as it is typically used to refer to the 
afferent sensory information from the autonomic nervous system, such as heart 
muscle, other smooth muscle (but not skeletal muscle which is included in the 
somatic nervous system), and the exocrine glands (i.e. sweat glands, saliva glands, 
stomach, liver, pancreas). Craig ( 2002 ,  2003a ,  b ) however has argued against this 
traditional way of categorizing the senses, advocating that “interoception should be 
redefi ned as the sense of the physiological condition of the entire  body , not just the 
viscera” (2002, p. 655). The reason for this is that recent research suggests that pain, 
temperature, and light touch are mediated by the same tracts in the spinal cord and 
subcortex as visceral information (Craig  2002 ,  2003b ; Craig and Blomqvist  2002 ). 
 These two different ways that interoception is defi ned, i.e., as the sense of the 
visceral  body and the sense of the entire physiological  body , are underpinned by 
different mechanisms in organisms that have developed nervous systems for medi-
ating the sensorimotor signals. After all, a  cell ’s ‘entire physiological  body ’ just  is 
its visceral  body . In humans, however, this difference in the term’s scope is impor-
tant. While changes in the viscera that threaten the system’s viability are dealt with 
by adapting internally, on their own they do not seem to intrinsically motivate 
action, at the very least not within the time scales with which we would normally 
judge  agency . The receptors that mediate pain, light touch, and temperature, how-
ever, are hooked up so that not only can activation induce a spinal refl ex (in very 
short time-scales) but their shared afferent pathway (with the visceral neurons) proj-
ects to motor areas in the brain such as the limbic motor cortex (ACC) for activation 
of movement over (still short but) longer time-scales (see Craig  2002 , for a compari-
son of his ‘spinothalamocortical pathway’ with the conventional pain pathways). 
This interoceptive-motor loop grounds what Craig calls ‘homeostatic emotions’ 
which arise from threats to the viability of the system which  homeostasis on its own 
cannot resolve (Craig  2003a ). Craig considers these to be homeostatic ‘emotions’ 
because both motivations  and sensations are generated. In addition to projections 
from this pathway to the limbic motor cortex there are also projections to the limbic 
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sensory cortex (insula) and in primates to the interoceptive cortex and from there to 
the right anterior insula (Craig  2003a ,  b ). This is of particular interest to us here 
because activity in the anterior insula cortex is consistently associated with subjec-
tive feelings and may even provide a basis for Sherrington’s ‘material me’ (Craig 
 2003b ). This supports our argument that  agency and  affectivity are fundamentally 
entwined and not only at the level of (fi rst-order) autopoietic  systems but also in 
complex organisms made up of various intersecting autonomous networks like our-
selves – a meshwork of selfl ess (i.e., non-reifi ed) selves ( Varela  1991 ). 
 These insights from the neurobiology of  interoception in primates allow us to 
gesture towards how it might be operationalized. An abstraction from its particular 
instantiation may be used to understand the different levels of  complexity of  agency 
in biological systems and their intrinsic  affectivity . Furthermore it can guide us in 
modeling  agency for the purposes of artifi cial cognitive systems research and robot-
ics. For now we wish to emphasize one particular point: while the instantiation of an 
interoceptive nervous system does not necessarily give an organism  more  agency 
than simpler agentive organisms (at least from what we have proposed so far – either 
you are an agent or you are not), it does give it a qualitatively different kind of 
 agency . This kind of  agency is not merely affective but instantiates a refl ective 
stance that is discussed by phenomenologists in terms of subjectivity. The  subject ’s 
 lived body is no longer always transparently lived through as the background for 
activity in the world, because this agential world-directed perspective can be turned 
on itself – inwardly – such that the  body becomes an explicit part of the subject’s 
experiential world rather than its implicit mode of revealing that world. In this way 
a new horizon of actions opens up, involving the development of new forms of 
mediated self-regulation. Thus, if we wanted to think of  agency as admitting of 
degrees, we could emphasize this more pronounced diversity and  asymmetry in the 
domain of agent-environment relations, which puts even more weight on the side of 
the  body of the agent, as an enhancement of  agency (Stapleton and  Froese  2015 ). 
 According to the  enactive theory of  agency , all agents are affective systems 
because of the  normativit y involved in their  adaptivity and sense-making. But it 
takes a special form of decoupled or mediated regulation of internal and interactive 
processes in order for an agent to be a cognitive agent (Barandiaran and Moreno 
 2006 ).  Following what we have said about  interoception , it seems plausible to sug-
gest that such a cognitive agent must at the same  time be a feeling agent, i.e. an 
agent that is able to make sense of the status of its internal processes.  Jonas ([1966] 
 2001 ) proposed that emotions co-emerge with distal  perception in order to enable 
the mediated regulation of actions across the greater spatiotemporal distances that 
perceptual experience reveals in the world, and which can no longer be bridged by 
mere reactive behaviour. The same logic applies to the greater internal distances 
revealed by interoception, whereby I perceive the state of my  body at the same time 
as I become distanced from merely being my  body , and my actions are guided by an 
assessment of how I feel. 
 It is at this point that we can start talking about subjectivity, rather than just 
 agency , since the self, at least in a minimal embodied form, has become an explicit 
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part of the concerns that motivate and guide actions. Much more needs to be said 
about this transition from the biological foundations of  agency to the phenomeno-
logical conditions of subjectivity, in particular with regard to full-blown  self- 
awareness , but we hope to have shown that  enactivism is in a good position to make 
progress on this diffi cult and deep question. What is clear is that the nervous system 
will play a central role in this story because its electrical activity liberates an agent’s 
capacity of regulation from underlying metabolic and developmental  constraints , 
thereby opening up a much wider range of internal and interactive actions and per-
ceptions, while at the same  time more tightly integrating the multicellular agent as 
a whole (Arnellos and Moreno  2015 ; Barandiaran and Moreno  2006 ). With respect 
to the question of the operational requirements of specifi cally human subjectivity, a 
deeper consideration of the constitutive role of social  interaction s and the pre- 
existing cultural context will become indispensable (Stewart  2010 ; Kyselo  2014 ). 
Yet the biological foundations of subjectivity will remain essential even as the 
socio-cultural extensions of the self begin to play a signifi cant role, which is why we 
are sceptical of the possibility of a genuinely collective  subject – an agent consisting 
of a social network of other agents without material integration but having its own 
fi rst- person experience (Stapleton and  Froese  2015 ). The complex material and 
functional requirements for the  emergence of such an integrated subjective ‘self’ 
from the perspective of a multicellular system as a whole (Arnellos and  Moreno 
 2015 ) are unlikely to be repeated at the purely social level due to its looser 
interactions. 
8.4  Conclusion 
 For an autopoietic  system to constitute an agent there must be suffi cient internal 
communication to allow the system to be sensitive to its own internal  dynamics and 
move in response to them and to perturbations in the  environment that threaten their 
boundaries of viability. Subjectivity requires something more, namely an interocep-
tively grounded form of  sense -making. We have briefl y described how this  intero-
ception is realized in the case of human agents. It is an open challenge for  enactivism 
to operationalize this physiology in such a way that we can better grasp the essential 
 dynamics that are being realized by the autonomic nervous system, and to deter-
mine in what manner these  dynamics could be realized in other forms of  embodi-
ment . At the same  time the enactive approach points beyond physiology to the 
essential socio-cultural dimensions of selfhood, which suggest that the  emergence 
of human subjectivity on the basis of organismic  agency cannot be fully understood 
in terms of changes in biological  embodiment alone. The self certainly cannot be 
reduced to the brain alone, but neither is it  limited by the  boundaries of the  body : 
there can be no self without others. 
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